Dec. 31, 1950 - We arrive at the island of Koje. The first stop is Jisepo. Jisepo was a naval base during the Yi dynasty, but it is now a fishing village. It is blessed with a natural harbor with a large lagoon. Its climate is mild and the seashores team with edible seaweed and shellfish - an ideal location for war refugees. Its population is probably less than 2,000. Over one hundred US army tents are erected for N Korean refugees on the beach. The refugees from Hungnam are dropped off and we head for Jangsepo, the administrative center of Kojedo.
Jangsepo - We finally reach our destination. Jansepo has a larger population than Jisepo and has some modern buildings. A group of S Korean police come aboard. We are shocked to notice that they are wearing the Japanese police uniforms - black cap and black cloth. They have even retained the Japanese name - Gei-sha-tzu! I guess the N Koreans were not lying about the S Korean police being made of Jap collaborators. This is not a good start - maybe we have made a big mistake switching side?
The policemen don't want a bunch of armed N Koreans (meaning us, the Student Volunteers Army) landing here. Why pick Jangsepo? No one knows for sure who has the authority to decide. Who will pay for our lodging and food? Refugees are taken care of by the UN. S Korean soldiers are taken care of by the Army. Who are responsible for us? We are neither refugees nor soldiers.
Some guys think that the Education Minister is our boss (after all we are the 'Student' Volunteers Army), but others think that the Defense Minister is our boss (we are the Student Volunteers 'Army'). Our commander is called into the discussion and starts negotiating. The Navy captain has his orders to move on to another assignment and wants to unload us right away. The village chief wants a written order from the central government.
After a long heated meeting, the policemen agree to let us land and provide a temporary lodging to us. They want custody of all of our weapons. They also want a written order from a S Korean authority clarifying what we are doing here as soon as possible. Our commander gives in to the police. He agrees to donate all the rice and other supplies we have brought from Hamhung. The navy captain agrees to take the commander to Pusan - the war time seat of Syngman Rhee's government. The commander says he knows some important people and will be back with funds and the official papers in a few days.
We are led to a small abandoned warehouse - our new quarters. Our bedding is a sleeping bag on a hardwood floor. We are divided into groups of 4 and assigned to a 'patriotic' family. The poor locals are 'volunteered' to feed a group until our commander comes back with funds. We are not exactly welcome guests to the locals. The locals are dirt poor themselves , eking out a living doing who knows what. Our meals consist of potato plants (no potatoes!), seaweed, boiled barley and some other foul smelling stuff.
Dec. 31, 1950 - The communists attack in force and close in on Seoul. The ROK Army once again fold and run. Gen. Ridgway (the new 8th Army commander after Gen. Walker's death) orders a general retreat, south of the Han River.
Jan. 4, 1951 - Seoul falls to the communists for the second time. On the east, the US 2nd Div. gets clobbered by the North Korean Army once again and abandons Wonju in a rout. The commanding general is fired. The communists run out of war supplies and pause for replacements. The front lines run along the Kum River. Gen. Ridgway brings up the X corps (evacuated from Hungnam with me) from Pusan to join the battle.
Ridgway learned an critical lesson from Sun Tzu - "holding a territory at all costs is a lunacy. Your primary goal is to kill the enemy, not occupying land". Mao puts it another way - "one eats first and then shits"; eating (killing enemies) comes first and taking real estate (relieving oneself) comes next. Gen. Ridgway is the first American general who understands how to fight the Asians.
Sun Tzu said -
"When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then weapons will be dulled and the soldiers' ardor will wane. If you get bogged down in an untenable situation, you will exhaust your strength needlessly. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the army will not be equal to the strain.
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, your opponents will spring up to take advantage of your weakness. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in campaigns, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. There is no instance of an army having benefited from prolonged campaigns."
Gen. Ridgway finds the 8th Army in shambles -
"There is a definite air of nervousness, of gloomy foreboding, of uncertainty, a spirit of apprehension as to what the future hold... It is clear to me that our troops had lost confidence, I can read it in their eyes, in their walk. I can read it in the faces of their leaders, from sergeants right on up to the top."
Ridgway fires five generals - commanders of the 2nd, 7th, 24th, 25th and 1st Cavalry divisions, all veterans of MacArthur's war in N Korea. Younger generals replace the old tired men ready for retirement. Ridgway reports - "the other fellow manages and he seems never to lack ammunition, the heaviest load in his logistics stream, though, of course, he uses impressed human carriers and every local form of transportation - oxen, camels, ponies and two-wheel carts....The Chinese and Koreans are in appearance but a shade above the human beast. It is by the use of such human canaille that the Soviets are destroying our men while conserving their own."
Jan 8 - Ridgway orders his troops to shoot any civilian suspected of being a communist before "they become prisoners." He asks MacArthur's permission to use poison gas. MacArthur denies Ridgway's request. MacArthur leaves Ridgway alone for a while. Ridgway tries to educate MacArthur the basics of a limited war -
To support the army in Korea, our mobilization base has been destroyed and our supply warehouses are bare. The United States is not capable of any major effort anywhere in the world except Korea."
Ridgway is the first commander who knows how to handle MacArthur.
Jan. 9, 1951 - The US Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an order to MacArthur -
"Defend in successive positions as required by JCS 99935 (Dec. 29, 1950), inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of defending Japan. Should it become evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid sever losses of men and material, you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan."
With the front lines stabilized by Ridgway, MacArthur's cockiness returns. The part about bugging out of Korea angers MacArthur and he shouts back to the JCS -
"Is it the present objective of United States political policy to maintain a military position in Korea - indefinitely, for a limited time - or to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?...Its military position is untenable, but it can hold for any length of time up to its complete destruction if overriding political considerations so dictate.".
Jan. 11, 1951 - The United Nations: The UN Cease-fire Commission is in full steam to end the war diplomatically. The Commission proposes: (1) An immediate cease-fire, (2) A political conference of all parties concerned and (3) Withdrawal of all foreign troops. A Chinese diplomat contacts a Chinese student in Washington, DC, who contacts a State Dept. employee - the Chinese diplomat wants to exchange "unofficial information." The State Dept. asks for the authentication of the diplomat - they want an American spy in Chinese prison released. The Americans are not aware their man has been dead for some time and that the Chinese cannot revive the man. Thus ends the first peace overture.
Jan. 12 - Truman sends Gen. Collins and Gen. Vandenberg to meet with MacArthur to assess his mental status. At the same time, Truman sends a personal letter to MacArthur begging for his understanding of the American foreign policy. Concurrently, the JCS sends a long explicit instructions to MacArthur. MacArthur replies to Truman's long letter with a curt - "We shall do our best." Collins and Vandenberg go over the JCS directives with MacArthur in detail, sentence by sentence.
Our Student Volunteers Army (SVA) detachment is made of an odd mix of people from N Korea. Everyone of us has a different reason why he has fled to south. There are deserters from the N Korean Army. They escaped from the Nakdong front and went into hiding in N Korea; when the US forces invaded N Korea, they came out of hiding. There are guys who went into hiding to avoid being pressed into N Korean Army. Most of us are teens nearing the military age.
Jan. 25, 1951 - The UN forces go on the offensive. Ridgway combines the 8th Army and the X corps and then split it into two new corps - X and IX. The communists forces are pushed back to the Han River. MacArthur is quick to take the credit.
Peng has learned that he cannot depend on Korean natives for logistics, that he is unable to maneuver freely to avoid combats on unfavorable terms and that he has little room for the tactics of avoidance as enunciated by Sun Tzu. Peng is forced to shed the people's war tactics and adopt the Soviet military doctrine of large formations backed by heavy fire power.
Jan. 30, 1951 - Kojedo: Days have gone bye without a word from our commander. We begin to wonder if the man has deserted us. Those who can afford the boat ride to Pusan are deserting us. Ostensibly, they want to look for our vanished leader in Pusan. In order to pay for our food, we collect firewood in the mountains and peddle them in the town market. Those who have rudimentary English get jobs with the American CIC as interpreters.
I am dejected - my idea of anti-communism crusade did not include physical labor for food. I envy the easy money my seniors are making working for the Americans. Unfortunately my English is not good enough for the job. I devote all of my free time to learning English - it is a matter of life or death for me.
My brother decides to go to Pusan and try his luck there. On the first day in Pusan, he runs into an old school friend from Hamhung and gets a job at a south Korean army hospital. The South Korean Army is acutely short of medical people and anyone with any knowledge of medicine is hired on the spot and pressed into doing surgery and other advanced medical chores.
My brother has only two years of medical education but he doing a surgeon's work at the hospital. He gets free meals and lodging at the hospital in addition to a small stipend. All "doctors" supplement their stipend with a side business - they steal medical supplies and sell them on the black market. Army hospitals are supplied by the Americans and no one feels bad about stealing them. There is plenty more where they came from. My brother is allowed to transfer from Hamhung Medical College to Seoul Medical College (refugee campus in Pusan) - no transcripts necessary.
After a month of waiting, we decide to disband our unit ourselves. Those who are 18 years or older join the S Korean army - the police chief is more than willing to make the arrangement. The under-aged (me included) are sent to the refugee camp at Jisepo. This is how the Student Volunteers Army (Hamhung Unit) met its end.
I learned three years later that our commander did obtain some fund from the Government (Education Ministry) but had decided to keep it for himself. He was discovered hiding among the refugees in Pusan, but there was no criminal charge brought against him. By this time, no one really cared much about the past. All of us are doing what we can to survive.
Feb. 6, 1951 - Washington: Truman decides to accept a cease-fire with Korea divided more or less along the 38th parallel. The American public wants the boys brought back home and ends "Truman's war". Dadung (China): The 18th Guard Aviation Regiment of the Soviet Army moves to Dadung and join the air war against US. Some 160 MIG's with N Korean markings are deployed. Stalin moves five infantry divisions to the Rajin border area ready to move.
Feb 15, 1951 - My comrades who joined the S Korean Army land at Samchok (a sea port on the east coast of S Korea) and walk right into an enemy ambush. Few survive. Most of my friends from N Korea perish in a single battle. The poor souls arrive in a single landing craft at Samchok - no covering fire and no scouting.
The commanding officer thinks the town is free of the N Korean Army and orders his men offshore. As soon as the troops are assembled on the beach, the enemy open fire and cut them to pieces. The commanding officer still on the ship abandons his men and escapes. He is later court marshaled and executed for cowardice.
Comrade Kim Ho was a student at Peking University (China) when the war broke out. He was sent home to fight the Americans but, instead, he went AWOL and joined the SVA in 1950. He worked for the US CIC for a number of years and emigrated to US where he earned Ph.D. in history. In 1985, he was killed in a motor cycle accident.
Comrade Park Hong Chul was a student at Kim Il Sung University. He was a captain in the N Korean Army and fought at Inchon. He managed to straggle back to Hamhung and went into hiding. He joined the SVA in November 1950. He worked for the US CIC for three years and graduated from Seoul National University. He taught at a S Korean university until his retirement.
Comrade Chang Suk was a student at Ham Hung Medical College when the war broke out. He was a captain (medical) and served in the Nakdong front. He straggled back to Hamhung after the Inchon landing and went into hiding. He joined the SVA and worked for the US CIC for 4 years. He went to Okinawa as an employee of the US State Dept. He retired in America in 1987.
Photo: My comrades (from Hamhung) in the S Korean Army - ROKA
Comrade Kim Ung Sik (my brother) was a student at Hamhung Medical College. He went into hiding when the war broke out to avoid being pressed into the N Korean Army. He was one of the first to join the SVA and one of the staff officers. He joined the S Korean Army Medical Corps at Pusan. He received MD and Ph.D. in Seoul. He held several administrative positions in the ROK Ministry of Health. Upon his retirement, he emigrated to America.
Feb. 17, 1951 - Jisepo: I am officially a civilian refugee. About 91,000 refugees from Hungnam, Hamhung and Wonsan are in the refugee camps at Kojedo. Refugees are housed in US army tents along the beach. They are organized into groups of 10 to 15 families.
Photo: With friends and a teacher on the Jisepo pier - The village of Jisep is in the background
Each group designates a group leader who reports to the camp leader. Refugees are fed by the UN Command - each refugee is entitled to daily ration of rice, canned food (GI rations), and other consumer goods. Each family prepares its own meals on the beach.
US army cans are used for cooking rice and soup. Children gather firewood and edibles from the ocean. The ocean provides a host of food - seaweed, clams, oysters and fish. The beach is ideal for cooking food - dried up driftwood make excellent firewood. I run into my neighbors from Hamhung.
Jisepo was a hotbed of the Korean People's Committee in 1945. The local peasants and fisherman took over the island from the Japanese on August 15, 1945. The two or three rich landowners who owned all arable land were eliminated along with all Japanese collaborators on the island. The Committee refused to obey the US Military Government's order to disband and fought with arms the invading troops (mostly former Japanese police and army soldiers). Several hundreds of the island's youth were killed and their bodies were thrown into the ocean. Even now, human bones wash up on the beach now and then. Many of the islanders are still bitter and hostile to the Americans and their puppets.
Refugee camps are run by corrupt people (refugees themselves) who pad the camp roster with ghosts. Ghost padding is also practiced by the Korean Militia ('Bang-Wie-Gung' - included many refugees of the military age) and some S Korean army commanders. The UN Command supplies daily rations and military pay based on head counts. The Commander of the Militia (reportedly a former body guard of Dr. Rhee) is executed for corruption.
Refugees are encouraged to leave the camp and become self-supporting as soon as possible. Many refugees start up a business or move to Pusan where opportunities abound for quick-buck schemes. One way in which a corrupt refugee official makes money is not to report those refugees who have left the camp. Rations for non-existent refugees are sold to local residents or to the sole business of Jisepo - a rice wine brewery.
The Dae Kwang School trustees (S Korea) help out the refugee kids by donating funds and teachers for a branch campus in Jisepo. Dae Kwang is funded by rich American and Korean Christians. Tents class rooms are set up on a mountain side. Students and faculty clear a patch of trees and brushes. Tents are donated by the US Army. The principal is a S Korean Christian woman genuinely motivated to educate the refugee kids. Some of the teachers are recruited from refugees. I enroll in the senior class along with 20 others.
Feb. 20, 1951 - Gen. Ridgway mounts his second major offensive - Operation Killer. MacArthur decides to grab the headlines and shows up at the 8th Army headquarters and calls a press briefing. He tells the press - "I have just ordered a resumption of the offensive." The offensive is supposed to be a surprise attack and here MacArthur is broadcasting the UN plan to the whole world.
What makes Ridgway angry is that MacArthur implies that he came to Korea to assess the situation himself and has decided to start the Operation Killer. Ridgway is outraged by MacArthur's apparent willingness to sacrifice American lives in order to keep his "public image always glowing.".
Ridgway maneuvers to keep the old man out of Korea; he tells MacArthur that his visits to Korea are sure signals to the communists of an impending UN offensive and therefore MacArthur is not welcome to Korea. MacArthur concurs and agrees to stay away until an operation is well under way.
March 7, 1951 - Suwon: MacArthur is back in Korea and steps on Ridgway's toes again. MacArthur makes a public statement which ridicules the American aim of a stalemate - why die for a non-win war - "die for tie"? MacArthur calls for war with China. Ridgway sees in MacArthur an exhausted and depressed man, a general who has lost his reputation, a defeated general looking for a miracle. To some, MacArthur reminded of Hitler during the last days of the Third Reich.
MacArthur is busy rewriting the war history. He calls his "home by Xmas" campaign a brilliant success -
"Our field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into the war, involving a rapid withdrawal to lengthen the enemy's supply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical difficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destructiveness of our air power, had worked well... The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory."
March 10 - Tokyo: MacArthur announces his own plans for ending the war -
"It can be accepted as a basic fact that unless the authority is given to strike enemy bases in Manchuria, our ground forces as presently constituted cannot with safety attempt major operations in North Korea. If I were still not permitted to attack the massed enemy reinforcements across the Yalu, or to destroy its bridges, I would sever Korea from Manchuria by laying a field of radioactive wastes - the byproducts of atomic manufacture - across all major lines of enemy supply.
Once the enemy supplies are exhausted, American reinforcements and Chinese Nationalists will make simultaneous amphibious and airborne landings at the upper end of both coasts of North Korea, and close a gigantic trap. The Chinese would soon starve or surrender. Without food and ammunition, they would become helpless. It would be something like Inchon, but on a much larger scale."
March 20, 1951 - The US CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) 308th Battalion (Kangnung Unit commanded by a Mr. Adams ) sets up a shop in an office at the rice wine brewery. The man in charge is Mr. Chung ("big Ming"), a former Japanese policeman from Hungnam. Mr. Chung reports to an American based in Pusan. Chung's job is to find communist agents hidden among the refugees.
He recruits informants among the refugees for this. Chung is paid by the Americans by the number of "intelligence" reports he sends. I am known as the English "expert" in Jisepo and I offer my service to the CIC. I translate CIC agents reports into English for Mr. Chung. I also translate instructions coming to Mr. Chung into Korean. My pay is the privilege of sleeping in the CIC branch office during the night - if Mr. Chung does not need the room for his frequent affairs with refugee women.
Another form of pay I receive working for Mr. Chung is the dried rice from the brewery. Rice is cooked , dried and then mixed with yeast for fermentation. I get to eat as much of the dried rice as my stomach can hold. In addition, I get to watch Mr. Chung fornicate - he says, it is part of my pay.
I get to be friend with the brewery owner's son (a few years older than I am) who loves to watch the show with me. Not much to do on this island. I have walked around the island several times now and not much new sight-seeing left. I spend about half of my time studying English and the other half talking politics with my fellow refugees.
The first CIC presence in Korea was the 607th, "K" Sub-Detachment, a small 3-men outfit, stationed at Kimpo. Its primary mission was the detection and prevention of subversives against US Air Force units in S Korea. It was also involved in screening S Korean civilians working for US units. The K detachment was embraced by Syngman Rhee as a means of suppressing his political opponents.
By 1947, the 607th had evolved into a large scale spy and counter-spy organization manned mainly by S Koreans. It had placed informers in the ruling circle of the Korean Workers Party and reliable agents in N Korea. It had accurate intelligence on N Korean agents' infiltration routes, methods of operations, and destinations. Donald Nichols, a US Air Force master sergeant, was in command of the operation. Nichols had direct access to Rhee and other ruling elite's of S Korea. Nichols had many of the leading politicians under wraps via friendly persuasion and coercion.
Nichols writes in his autobiography -
"I soon learned one of the most effective ways to control high level politicians is through a state of fear. Everyone has a skeleton to hide; find out what, where, or who it is, and you have your man more-or-less under control. I used this tactic with any official I couldn't win over by sheer friendship and magnetism. There was a lot of guerrilla warfare activity in S Korea prior to 1950. Often, leaders of these groups were apprehended, their heads were cut off, placed in containers of gasoline and brought to headquarters for identification and proof."
In October of 1949, Rhee established the S Korean Air Force, made of a handful of US Army observation L-5 planes. Its primary function was intelligence over-flights over N Korea. Nichols was made an honorary citizen and colonel of S Korea by Rhee. Nichols' outfit was designated as the US AF 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) based in Pupyon near Seoul.
